-. twThe"cd 3ifdlavailable provides strong support for most of the assumptions -;*abotit rdstfial world (the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD). Given the present high levels of consumption in industrial countries, additional energy use is likely to be minimal, and there appears to be a consensus that little or no growth in overall demand is likely.
Environmental concerns, technological progress, and well-functioning markets and administrative systems make additional declines in energy intensities likely.
The position of the industrial world, however, is becoming less relevant in global projections of demand and supply. By the turn of the century almost all of the growth in energy demand will be in the developing countries. Most scenarios show these demands growing from less than a third to almost two-thirds of total energy consumption by 2020. These projections substantially understate the potential growth of energy demand in the developing countries. In thirty years the industrial world may account for less than 25 percent of total energy consumed.
These scenarios assume that demand in the developing world will be oDnstrained by a combination of policies and technical progress that will dramatically improve energy efficency. In most cases the evidence to support these assumptions relies on engineering studies showing how, by moving to best practices, the services of a particular product can be produced with lower inputs of energy. The policies required to produce these changes in practice are usually poorly specified and often rely to an unusual degree on administrative actions. The study by Goldemberg and others (1987) is a good example of this type of forecasting.
This paper examines these scnarios and concludes that most of them seriously underestimate the growth of demand in developing countries. The rates of economic growth and, by implication, the growth in overall economic efficiency used in most of these models would make it possible to overcome many of the factors that presently constrain energy consumption. Increased efficienqc and falling real prices for many energy services, together with growing per capita incomes, could increase demand to two or three times the level of most of the "igh" or "businessas-usual" scenarios. The implications for supply, prices, trade, technology, and the environment will be examined here using the basic supply-and-demand analytical framework. The time-frame is the next thirty years.
The Demand Scenarios
Population estimates inherently have a high degree of inertia-at least in the relatively short run. Under the assumptions used in most population projections, the total population reached in 2020 varies within a range of plus or minus 10 percent because the underlying patterns of human behavior change only slowly. But if we go beyond this period, projections can differ by as much as 50 percent by the middle of the next century, depending on the assumptions. Projections by the United Nations that were used both in World Development Report 1992 (World Bank 1992b and in a World Energy Council study (wEc 1993) range from a high of 8.5 billion to a low of 7.8 billion, with an intennedi-ate or base case of 8.1 billion. By 2050 the range is from 13.S billion to 9.4 billion. These population estimates reflect a high degree of conserisus, and-at least for the next thirty years-we can be reasonably confident that our projections will approximate reality.
The WEC projections use tWO GDP growth rates for developing countries: 4.6 and 5.6 percent a year. Given the rates of population growth, the 5.6 percent estimate would imply per capita income growth of just under 2 percent a year, or slightly less than the average during 196090.
How realistic are these growth rates? They are zertainly well below the aspirations of most countries of the world. In recernt years the best performers have achieved rates considerably higher than these levels. China has grown at more than twice this average, apd a number of smaller countries have had even more rapid rates of growth. Faster growth in China and India, combined with at least an average performance by the Sub-Saharan African countries, could produce aggregate growth rates significantly higher than the 2 percent assumed in the higher projection.
Most of the countries that record high per capita use of energy have reached the point at which energy demands are unrelated to the rate of economic growth. This is not the case in the developing world. Historical figures show a great deal of variation, both by country and by time period. The range of income elasticities associated with energy consumption at the macroeconomic level is generally 1.S to 3.0. Microeconomic studies suggest an income elasticity of about 1.5 for individuals and households. Yet cross-sectional studies over time indicate that income elasticity declines at the macroeconomic level. The usual hypothesis is that income elasticities are high at low incomes but decline as income rises-as seen by the lower ratio of energy use per unit of GDP in richer countries.
HIistorical experience must be interpreted with caution, however. For instance, the ratio of energy use to CDP in the United States began to decline in the 1920s. With the oil shock of the 1970s, rising prices of basic inputs (over a short period) gave further impetus to technological change, and supply efficiencies continued to improve. But how much of this decline can be attributed to rising incomes (or a changing composition of output) and how much to technological progress is unclear. Both factors were dearly at work.
World Bank 1992b reports a strong correlation between energy consumption and ;DP. The basic assumption used in the demand projections is that this curve is shifting downward over time, so that the same level of GDP can be produced with a lower input of energy. Technological progress can be sufficient to explain this shift. But how fast the curve is shiftng is a matter of speculation at present.
One of the main features of technological progress or similar measures which improve efficiency is that they lower costs. Most energy services are price elastic; declining prices lead to increased consumption. Electricity is an important example. Throughout this century there have been continuous improvements in the efficiency of electric power as technological progress more than kept up with rising costs of labor. In real terms, prices fell substantially. In more recent years growth in end-use efficiency has lowered the prices of final energy services.
Demand has also grown rapidly. The services provided by commercial energy sources reached new segments of the population and were applied to a new range of goods and services. The expansion of electric power networks, in particular, brought a new and more convenient form of energy to an expanding population. Improvements in both the manufacture and the efficiency of the internal combustion engine lowered the real costs of mobility, bringing about a continuing expansion of demand for transport services.
Some saw the oil shock of the 1970s as the beginning of a new era of scarcity in which prices of raw materials would continue to rise, establishing a new relationship between income growth and energy use. The Club of Rome was a leading exponent of this view. In fact, the price rise was only temporary, and technology has continued to push down the real costs of the services provided by energy. The automobile is the most dramatic example. Major design changes and improved engine efficiencies, along with the use of lighter materials, have produced a vehicle that can deliver more miles at a lower cost. The net result has been an increase in the use of automobiles and a greater demand for fuels than would have occurred in the absence of either the initial price shock or legal restrictions on fuel efficiency.
The issue is whether this experience applies to growth of demand in the developing world. Most projections assume that developing countries will achieve higher levels of income with less energy per capita than was the case in previous generations. There is good evidence to support this assumption. An examination of most production functions shows less use of energy (or increasing efficiency) as a result of technological progress. Today's automobile or refrigerator delivers a higher quality of service than the similar product of ten or twenty years ago. One would expect to see a similar pattern in the developing world as occurred in today's industrial countries; improvements in efficiency will bring about lower energy prices, which in turn will lead to expanded markets and new uses for energy.
In the developing countries there is a further complication: a number of energy-related services are subject to nonmarket-or physical-rationing. In many countries electric power is provided at highly subsidized prices to those with access to the system. A large percentage of the population-in Africa nearly 90 percent-has no access to these services at posted tariffs, and even those with access often pay a multiple of the subsidized price. In Nigeria and Indonesia, for example, more than half the users have their own generators because the subsidized public service is too unreliable. Their real costs are more likely to be 25 cents per kilowatt-hour than the posted tariff of 5 cents. If one counts the additional costs of brownouts, blackouts, voltage fluctuations, and so on, the real costs are high indeed. With improvements in service delivery, the real costs of supply could decline dramatically. These lower costs would make it possible to reach new consumers who are presently being rationed out of the market.
The same distortions apply to the market for household cooking fuels. In Africa, for example, the delivered price to the household of kerosene is five times the price at the port. Much of the markup is the result of policies that permit excessive rents to be collected along the distribution chain. Changing these policies could mean a large increase in kerosene consumption because of the significant shift in the price of kerosene in relation to that of wood fuels.
The main elements of the analytical framework are in place. As economic growth occurs, incomes rise. Demand for energy services is related to this income growth. At low levels of income the demand for energy-intensive goods appears to be relatively elastic, and energy demand is likely to grow faster than income. In addition, prices of energy services will decline because of improvements in efficiency and in technology. Improvements in efficiency appear to be income related; the rich are more efficient than the poor. The African householder uses four to five times the amount of energy to cook an evening meal as the typical European householder.
What are the quantitative implications? If energy services are income elastic, and if we use the most conservative of these income elastidties (1.5) together with an annual per capita growth rate of 2 percent, the annual growth in energy demand amounts to 3 percent. Add to this the growth in population (assume an average of 1.6 percent over this period), and energy demand can be assumed to be growing at 4.8 percent a year.
How do we account for the price effects from improved efficiencies or technological progress? Observers suggest that the developing countries are at least 25 percent less efficient than the industrial countries. If, after tirt years, they reach at least the level of efficiency of today's industial countries, real prices will decline by about 25 percent. If consumption increases more or less in proportion to the decline in prices, demand will be 25 percent higher than it would have been in the absence of a price decline. This would raise the growth of energy demand to 6 percent, more than five times the wEc's high-scenario estimates (or those of most other "high-case" scenarios). Moreover, these figures are based on the low end of the estimates of per capita income elastcities.
Different assumptions about growth rates, income and price elasticities, technological progress, and policies can change these results, but it is difficult to see what plausible assumptions about any of these parameters could alter the basic outcome by a factor of five. One could assume declining income elasticities over time, but given the low initial levels of energy consumption, it is difficult to anticipate any decline in this figure. Per capita income in the largest developing countries is one-tenth to one-twentieth the OECD average.
Policy changes can be important. Governments, for example, could try to capture all the efficiency gains through prices and to soak up the resulting consumer surpluses through the tax system. The practicality of doing so is, however, open to question. Intetnsity, 1990 Intetnsity, -2020 (percent per year) 1960-6S 196S-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985- It is reasonable to expect that the introduction of market-based pricing and other efficiency incentives will reduce energy intensities in the future. How fast this will happen is a matter of conjecture, and most of the projections appear to be on the optimistic side. Other factors may work in the opposite direction, and scenarios that call for higher energy consumption even though efficiency is improved are equally plausible. Much of the inefficiency in the former cenally planned economies is the result of the lack of incentives, particularly pricing, in the industial sector. These command economies also distorted the pattern of final output, suppressing the demand for consumer goods. The introduction of market-based pricing will inevitably shift final output in this direction, increasing the demand for housing, labor-saving appliances, and personal transport, all of which are energy-intensive. The rapid growth in consumer demand could well offset some of the expected declines in energy use from a more efficient industrial sector.
Scenario

Couiltrygroup
Estimates of energy use in the developing countries vary but generally show energy intensities increasing in the 1980s. Most projections then bravely assume a declining trend. The point is that energy intensities have historically declined during periods of rapid growth and increased during periods of slow growth. (High growth rates meant a more intense use of existing resources, and low growth rates led to surplus capacity arising from previous investments.)
There are other possible interpretations of these events. In the developig countries a large percentage of the population has no access to commercial sources of energy, particularly electric power. The expansion of these networks is largely in the hands of the public sector. Although the growth of the networks is constrained by the overall fiscal situation (which in turn tends to be correlated with the rate of growth), there are considerable lags, and for the most part systems have continued to expand even when economic growth declined (Africa is a good example). Access to commercial sources of energy generally leads to a substantial decline in the price of energy. Moving from kerosene lamps to electric lamps produces a quantum increase in the quality of service at a substantially lower price. As noted above, rationing by the public sector forces users to develop cosdy alternatives such as providing their own generating facilities for electric power. In Indonesia and Nigeria, for example, more than half the electricity is supplied in this form at costs that are several times higher than would be possible with efficient public supply. These consumers are price sensitive, and increased commercial capacity could bring about a large increase in the demand for electricity.
In one major producer, China, the evidence supports the assumption of declining energy intensities as a result of pricing policy and measures to promote efficiency (see Polenske and Lin 1993) . Throughout the 1980s energy intensity was reduced from initially high levels. Clearly, inefficiency in energy management was so high that China was able to achieve major improvements by simply moving closer to world standards. Rapid growth has also meant that more energy-efficient new capital stock accounts for a larger percentage of the total capital stock. But structural changes in the economy, combined with high rates of economic growth, are exerting upward pressures on overall energy intensity. China is still a country of very low per capita energy consumption. This cannot help but change with growth, even under the most extreme assumptions about achieving efficiency in energy consumption.
As the developing economies grow, increasing access to oDmmercial energy sources may well bring about a higher growth of energy demand than is generally forecast. 2 At present the expansion of these services is being constrained by the inability of the public sector either to mobilize the necessary resources or to deliver them efficiently. This forces a large percentage of the populations of these countries to use more costly alternatives, thus constraining overall.use of energy. But the reforms now under way promise to open up the possibility of much more rapid growth in the extension of energy use-and at lower cost (see World Bank 1993) . The pace is likely to be accelerated, as well, by urbanization. By 2000 more than 50 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas where services can be provided at lower cost tan where the population is more dispersed.
The link between growing incomes and the demand for transport with its high energy use is, at best, weakly factored into these estimates. Once incomes are high enough,. there is bound to be an explosive growth in demand for motorized transport. In the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand a significant part of the population appears to have crossed this threshold. Continued improvements in transport technology and the resulting lower costs of personal mobility will mean that developing countries will cross the threshold at lower levels of income than occurred in the past, leading, again, to higher rates of growth in energy demand than are currendy predicted.
In conclusion, most estimates of demand are probably right in assuming that improved practices and technologies will allow developing countries to produce the same level of energy services with a lower input of energy. Where they may be wrong is in how this development will affect the overall growth of energy use. In the developing world the expansion of the market for commercial energy sources and the impact of increased efficiency on prices may well overwhelm any declines projected from either policy measures or technological progress. In the former U.S.S.R. and the Central European economies the demand for consumer goods, particularly those associated with housing and transport, could lead to large increases in demand even in the presence of rapid improvements in efficiency.
These projections are not consistent with either the possible range of income elasticities or the declines in prices arising from improved efficiencies. Even by 2020 per capita consumption of energy in the developing world will be well below the levels currently prevailing in the industrial world. Developing countries today consume 4 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per capita annually, in contrast to the U.S. average of 58 boe and the European average of 26 boe. Most of the projections assume that consumption will more than double in thirty years, to a level that will still be less than 18 percent of present U.S. consumption. In the high-growth period of the 1970s this figure doubled in a decade; in the 1980s it grew by 50 percent.
It would be interesting to take the projected level of income per capita in 2020, wfork out the resulting per capita level of energy consumption, and compare it with per capita energy consumption in today's developing countries at the same level of real income. Some differences should be expected, and they could be interpreted as reflecting technical progress.
But what are the implications of a more rapid rate of growth? In the developing world growth of energy demand several times higher than is implicit in most projections appears to be a great deal more plausible than the projections we have just examined. It is certainly more consistent with historical experience and with the planning figures being used by most developing countries. Given the present low levels of consumption to begin with, there are no compelling reasons for assuming that income elasticities will approach those of the high-income consumers within the next thirty years. In all of the more rapidly growing economies the rate of growth of energy demand has always exceeded the rate of growth of GDP.
The potential for an explosive growth in energy demand exists. But are there constraints that will limit the responsiveness of energy markets to this expected increase in demand?
The Constraints Rising prices for primary fuels or higher costs associated with environmental practices could hold down demand for energy. Are higher prices likely? In the case of primary fuels, the consensus is that, at least in the next decade, an increase is unlikely. Beyond that, the price of oil is of concern, but in the longer term oil has its substitutes and) in any case, reserves are more than adequate to cover potential demand in this thirty-year period (World Bank 1993) .
Rising environmental costs may add to the costs of the energy transformation process, but they are not expected to be significant. Continued technological progress in this area will hold down costs. For the developing world, technologies adopted in the industrial countries offer ample scope for dealing with pollution. The only potential case in which cost increases may be significant is if there is a global agreement to radon emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). On the basis of present knowledge, such a move is unlikely.
Physical Supplies
The next thirty years will not be supply constrained by a lack of primary energy sources. In some theoretical sense the supplies of fossil fuels are finite, but in reality technological progress has continued to expand the definition of what is economic. In real terms, the price of oil, for example, has fluctuated within a narrow range for more than a hundred years as supply has kept up with demand. Present proven reserves at today's prices are more than adequate to cover estimated world demand for the next thirty years, even if consumption in the developing countries were to double. A conservative estimate suggests that proven reserves will be available, at today's production rates and prices, in the case of oil for 40 years, of natural gas for 56 years, of coal for 197 years, and of lignite for 293 years (wEc 1993, p. 71) .
Historically, there has been a tendency to understate reserves because proving reserves requires resources and there is little incentive for expanding time horizons beyond a few decades. A more realistic estimate, which makes assumption about potential rates of discovery, would increase these estimates by a factor of 2 to 5. Even modest assumptions about technological progress would increase the figures several fold. Increased efficiency in consumption-whether for reasons of policy or technological progress-would enhance the availability of reserves even further.
The wEc high scenario (case A) shows the following pattern of global fuel use by 2020 (in gigatons of oil equivalent, or Gtoe): These estimates are consistent with the low-demand scenarios discussed above and take into account changes in the mix of fossil fuels, shifts in demands for electricity and gas, and the prospects for both nuclear and such "new" renewables as solar energy, commercial biomass, wind energy, and so on. Questions can be raised about the commercial and political feasibility of the projected increases in nuclear energy, but it is only a small share of the total, and adequate supplies of fossil fuels, particularly coal, are available to make up any shortfalls. Global coal supplies, for example, are expected to double between 1990 and 2015 under assumptions of constant real prices. Annual rates of growth of 3 percent or more are not anticipated to create supply problems (see World Bank 1992a) .
The WEC scenario (case C) that is consistent with maintaining CO 2 emissions at 1990 levels for thirty years assumes that coal production will fall to 2.1 Gtoe, or below present global levels. Since consumption of coal is growing in India and China, it is difficult to conceive of a change of this order of magnitude within the next thirty years.
In fact, one can argue that these estimates understate the potential increase in supplies available through changes in technology. The most constrained fuel in the above scenario is liquid hydrocarbon. Supplies are adequate for the period in question, but doubts have been raised about deliveries beyond 2020. Since oil is increasingly being used for transport and at present has a strong comparative advantage as a transport fuel, the projected large increases in demand for transport, particularly in the developing countries, may weTl lead to pressures for rising prices before the end of the period.
Technology
Can other fuels be substituted for oil in the transport market? The technology exists for converting natural gas to a liquid. In the 1970s the cost of this process was equivalent to more than $40 a barrel; today it is about half that amount. Further progress could mean that plentiful supplies of natural gas could be converted into a competitive transport fuel at today's prices.
Another possibility is the development of commercially feasible electricpowered vehides. The primary constraint is storage technology, but progress is being made, and at some time within the next thirty years-possibly much sooner-the electric car will be a reality. If this happens, coal, nuclear or solar energy, or any of the alternative fuels for generating electricity may well weaken oil's comparative advantage.
The technology for generating electric power could enhance overall supplies of energy without increasing costs. The prospects are good that if present cost trends continue, photovoltaic and solar-thermal technologies will become competitive with fossil fuels before the end of the period. In addition, experiments are under way to develop ocean-thermal sources of electric power. Other technologies, such as wind and biomass, are probably too limited to provide any large-scale substitution for fossil fuels.
Nuclear power remains a qucstion mark. Concerns about the costs, safety, and waste disposal problems of existing plants raise serious issues about the feasibility of this technology. The debate has taken on strong emotional overtones, and it is not always possiblc to separate fact from fiction. There is a respectable body of scientific opinion which believes that with appropriate design and other changes it will be possible to overcome present limitations, and governments have committed large amounts of resources to developing the needed technologies. In a period of thirty years it is not inconccivable that technical breakthroughs may make nuclear power a more attractive option. If so, the energy supply horizon will be expanded even further.
Other supply options are also on the horizon, although perhaps with a longer lead time. Fuel cells and hydrogen-based technologies are in their infancy, but subttantial progress is likely. Perhaps somewhere beyond the period in question, fusion technology, with its promise of limitless and environmentally acceptable energy, will become available.
Even without changes in technology, the supply situation looks robust for the next thirty years. Adequate supplies of most fuels are likely to be available at close to today's prices (in real terms) even if demand in the developing world grows to two or three times the level assujmed by most scenarios. Looking beyond 2020, however, the uncertainties increase. The reserves of fossil fuels other than coal depend on further expenditures on exploration as well as on developments in technology. Proving reserves is expensive and the incentive to look beyond thirty years is minimal.
Environment
Three sets of issues need to be examined with respect to the environment: local pollution, transboundary pollution, and global impact. World Bank 1992b makes a persuasive case for dealing with local pollution problems. Most pollutants can be controlled to acceptable levels within the constraints of existing technology. In the world's richer countries large amounts of resources are being devoted to improving these technologies; the United States, for example, is spending more than $5 billion on clean-coal research. Continued improvements in technology and lower costs will further assist in dealing with most of the pollutants in the energy transformation process. Higher rates of economic growth and of energy consumption will affect the rapidity with which local pollution problems are addressed. In Japan and Europe expansion of the consumption of energy since World War II has resulted in an almost complete replacement of the capital stock used to produce eleL..ric power, enabling the industry to incorporate not only improvements in efficiency but also the latest technology for pollution abatement. The replacement of capital stock has been the instrument for achieving low levels of pollution in Japan and most Western European countries. Similar and even more dramatic opportunities exist in the developing world, which is expected to double its production of electric power in the next decade. Within a relatively short period of time, most of the capacity will be new, thus upgrading the standards of the capital stock.
Transboundary pollution is a problem because the beneficiaries of the improvements are different from those incurring the costs. Two leading cases involve acid rain from U.S. and Chinese power plants. Canada and the United States are in the process of dealing with the issue through international treaties and local abatement measures. Similarly, opportunities exist for those on the receiving end of the costs of pollution to encourage, through financial and other transfers, a more desirable investment pattern in China.
A more recent example concerns the pollution in Western Europe that originates in the countries to the east. It is not dear whether this is a transboundary problem or a local pollution problem that remains unsolved because of the insensitivity of central planning to consumer demands. It is quite likely that an appropriate accounting would show that the benefits, to the local population of reducing pollution are sufficient to justi the costs of cleaning up. Nevertheless, to speed the process, it may be in the interest of Western European countries to provide additional financial incentives.
Thus some degree of optimism can be expressed with respect to the ability of most countries to deal with local and transboundary pollution problems. It is both technically and financially feasible and should limit the expansion of energy supply and demand, although it will not happen as quickdy or as efficiently as one would wish.
The real threat to the expansion of globil energy supplies is the concern about global warming. This is basically a property rights issue. If there is a limit on the C0 2 that can be absorbed without incurring unacceptable costs, the right to add to or subtract from the global comnons becomes a valuable property right. As with most common property, the problem of controlling rights or access is the central issue. At present, there is no consensus on who holds the property rights-the irresponsible consumers or the inesponsible producers. Given the uncertainties about what will happen, to whom, where, and when, as a result of any potential change in global temperatures, it is not likely that we will arrive at a way of limiting CO 2 emissions. This situation may change, however, as more information becomes available.
Various attempts have been made to model the release of CO 2 (and other greenhouse gases) inherent in the projected increases in energy demand. The n7aC pro5etons, under the assumptions m case A, produce a 92 percent increase in carbon emissions-a figure similar to those forecast by most base-case scenarios, such as the World Energy 3utlook model developed by the International Energy Agency (mA). The attempt is then made to work backward from these projections in order to understand the policy implications of a lower rate of carbon emissions.
One of the most detailed of these attempts, that of the iEA, looks specifically at the impact of various policy changes in the OECD countries (see Skinner and Smyser 1992) . To reduce carbon emissions in the OECD countries would require fairly draconian measures. A carbon tax of $130 a ton, which is equivalent to tripling the price of coal and doubling the prices of most other fuels, would slow the increase in emissions by 200S from 22 to 7 percent. Seventy percent of the impact is attributable to lowered demand for energy; the remainder reflects a switch in fuels. Other economic incentives could achieve a similar effect. The result would be a decline in the growth of global emi-'ions from 40 to 33 percent.
The WEC projectionis look at several alternatives. For example, holding CO 2 levels to 1990 levels (case C) implies an annual reduction in energy intensities of 2.4 percent, or more than twice the best historical experience. Energy demand in the OECD countries would have to decline in absolute terms by about 12 percent, and growth in energy demand in the developing world would double, implying almost no increase in per capita consumption. Even halving the increase in CO 2 emissions would imply drastic changes in efficiency levels, prices of fuels, and other strategic parameters. Yet the projections assume that such policies will not affect the rate of growth.
In most developing countries it has been difficult to get govemments to agree on energy prices that cover the existing costs of production; it is unlikely that they would agree to policies that would limit carbon emissions. Even the OECD countries may be unwilling to impose the types of taxes, regulations, and price increases that would be required to limit their already high levels of consumption. Both the United Kingdom and Germany, for example, are continuing to subsidize domestic coal production.
If growth in energy demand in the developing world is underestimated by anydting dose to the levels suggested by this paper, the challenge is even more daunting. Carbon emissions could rise not by 92 percent but by as much as 300 percent. It is difficult to predict the increase with any accuracy because changes of this order of magnitude may weil influence the relative urices of fuels and the choices of technology. The fact that much of this growth will be in India and China suggests a largely coal-based expansion, with high C0 2 emissions.
If global warming turns out to be a serious problem, and if countries are either unwilling or unable to agree on sufficiently drastic measures, what are the alternatives? Again, technological change will have to provide the answer. Can we be confident that such changes are either possible or inevitable? A World Bank study (1992a) makes the point that when taxes or efficiency measures with positive costs are added to the economic costs, moving to existing low-polluting technologies is always cheaper. In fact, if prices were charged for emissions, one would expect market forces, over the long run, to lead to thc selection of these technologies. Given the prevalence of monopolies and the generally noncompetitive nature of large parts of the energy industry, moving directly to emission controls may be more effective than trying to do it through prices.
One of the existing technologies for limiting CO 2 emissions is nuclear power. Although some scientists maintain that this source is or can be made costcompetitive with fossil fuels, many observers believe that when safety and other environmental costs are considered, it is more expensive. But how much more expensive? World Bank 1992a suggests a 20 percent rise (a figure that would be disputed by the industry). This is obviously a cheaper way of dealing with global warming than some of the other measures proposed, but there are other implications as well. Nuclear and renewable fuels are more capital-intensive. If the developing world is to use nuclear power (or any other expensive technology), the richer countries will have to provide appropriate incentives. The implied transfer would be larger than present aid flows for all purposes.
As noted earlier, nudear power is not a solution that appeals to everyone. Some policymakers believe that the threat inherent in the expansion of this technology is as disagreeable as global warming. Obviously, there are tradeoffs that cannot be made within the confines of present knowledge. Solar energy offers considerable potential for large-scale power generation without the emission of CO 2 , although costs are too high and better storage technologies need to be developed. But in today's world of rapidly changing technologies, thirty years is a long time and we may regret taking expensive measures to solve tomorrow's problems with today's technologies.
Finance
The process of energy transformation is capital-intensive, and some of the newer, less-polluting technologies are even more so. The capital requirements of even the VEc base case cited above, let alone those of a more rapid increase in demand, will challenge the ability of many countries to raise the required resources.
Projected rates of economic growth, particularly in the developing world, will require adequate savings and investment. The issue is whether the capital requirements of the energy sectjr will place undue demands on domestic and international financial resources. There is no evidence to support this contention. Typically, economies growing in the range of 4 to 5 percent a year have had savings and investment rates bf about 20 percent. Investments in the energy sector have taken between 15 and 20 percent of this total, or 2 to 4 percent of GDP. Most of this capital will have to come from domestic savings; no country can borrow these amounts without running into serious balance of payments problems.
The higher levels of demand suggested by this paper are consistent with past trends in energy investment as a share of total investment or as a percentage of GDP. Slower growth, as implied by the wEc and other projections, would mean a significant decline in energy investments in relation to GDP unless much higher prices are assumed. New technologies, such as combined-cyde gas turbine plants for electric power, have actually lowered costs.
cm la
The financial problem that does exist in the developing world-and it is one that is likely to be with us for some time to come-is capital shortage resulting from public ownership and control. The combination of subsidized prices and poor performance has made it almost impossible to attract private savings and has left the public sector with the responsibility for raising the necessary resources. This problem has been exacerbated in recent years by the government's growing responsibilities for a wide range of social and economic activities. Shortage of public capital is the driving force behind most of the reform programs in developing countries. If these constraints are overcome, it will enhance the ability of most countries to deliver a higher level of service at lower cost.
Institutions
The most important constraining factor in meeting the expected growth in demnand will be institutional capacity. Subsidized prices have led to the rationing of electric power and other forms of commercial energy. Inefficient public monopolies dominate much of the sector, limiting supply alternatives. Energy consumers are forced to seek more expensive and less efficient solutions (see Lee and Annas 1992; World Bank 1993) .
There is a growing realization that existing institutions limit a country's options, and many governments are taking steps to overcome these limitations by assigning a more important role to the private sector. Prices that reflect costs will provide the incentives for greater efficiency and will, in turn, lower costs and permit a more rapid expansion of markets. There are thus considerable grounds for optimism that in the next thirty years institutional constraints will no longer hamper management of energy resources.
Politics and Trade
The real world is a complicated place, and there is a temptation to overlook these complexities in long-term planning. It is remarkable that in spite of wars, political tensions, rapid growth, and dramatic changes in technology, energy supplies have never been more than a short-term problem in this century. Energy services have grown enormously, and costs have generally decreased. And in all cases the short-term problems have been political ones rather than the result of any fundamental changes in production functions.
But what about the future? Undoubtedly there will be short-term interruptions in supplies in response to political events. The rich will be able to take care of themselves either by bidding away supplies from the not so rich or by substituting capital for raw materials in the energy transformation process. For the poor, the prospects are more troublesome. Short-term dismptions, such as the Gulf war, caused serious hardships to a number of vulnerable countries.
Undoubtedly these supply disruptions, if they continue, will encourage the substitution of other fuels for petroleum. As demands for energy in the developing world grow, so, inevitably, will the diversity of energy sources. In many countries the productive capacity of the natural resource base has been constrained by underdevelopment. Economic growth and greater efficiency in the energy sector will permit the development of these resources. China, for example, has vast reserves of coal and may also have oil. India is in a similar situation. More efficient utilization of these resources will make energy markets truly global. The increased size of both domestic and international markets will make it less likely that local political events will disrupt orderly deliveries.
Conclusion
During the years of rapid growth in the developing world, the rule of thumb was that the use of energy would double every decade. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, this rule was still applicable in the rapidly growing countries of East Asia. The plans envisioned by India, China, and many other developing countries in the 199Os are consistent with this patterni. Yet many of the long-run projections predict a dramatic reversal: a slowdown to less than the rate of economic growth. This decline may be appropriate for the industrial countries, but not for the developing world and not in the next thirty years. Although demand may reach a saturation point at a lower level of energy use (because of technical progress) than in the industrial countries, that point is a long way off. Present levels of energy consumption in industrial countries are a tenth of those registered by the historical economic leaders before they experienced a decree .e in income elasticities. Growth rates in the demand for energy in developing ctuntries of betweeD S and 7 percent are quite possible for sustained periods in the next thirty years. This is not to say that lower growth rates are possible under assumptions of greater efficiency; rather, it indicates that other scenarios are even more plausible.
Although growth of this magnitude will create some stresses and strains on supply, these problems will not be unmanageable. Supplies are adequate, and technological progress will produce new sources and new means of producing energy. The biggest constraint in the developing countries will be their institutional structure. The speed with which these structures are adjusted to create a more efficient supply system will be critical in determining the ultimate pace of economic growth.
Maintaining adequate safeguards on the environment will add to costs, 1-ut not significantly. Technological progress will lower costs over time. The biggest unknown is the impact of global warming. The present state of knowledge is insufficient to produce the global consensus that will be required seriously to address this issue in developing countries. Ultimately, the answers will have to be found in changes in technology rather than in any dramatic reduction in energy consumption. 's World (wFc 1993) . This report by the World Energy Council provides one of the most recent and detailed accounts of the various scenarios available. It develops four scenarios for demand in the developing world over a thirty-year period on the basis of a variety of assumptions. The projections range from a slightly morc than doubled demand to a more than tripled demand. Its case A, with the highest rate of growth of energy consumption, is similar to the 1992 projection of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (iPcc).
Notes 1. See data in Energyfor Tomorrow
2. At least for this decade, the anticipated growth in demand is consistent with the historical evidence of high-income elasticities. Typical demand estimates in most projects being prepared by the World Bank show growth rates of 6 to 12 percent (see, for example, World Bank 1990) . There is no evidence of any slowdown in the growth of energy demand.
COMMENT ON "ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN TfhE DEVELOPING WORLD 1990-2020," BY CHURCHILL
Charles D. Kolstad
A nthony Churchill's paper is both constructive and provocative. I am not 1-1 sure that I agree with his forecast, but the analysis does conform to my _L JLintuition about energy supply and demand over the next twenty-five years. The paper focuses on a variety of factors that will bring about rapid growth in global demand for energy in the coming decades-at least, more growth than is being forecast by such groups as the World Energy Council.
I am reminded of a seminar I attended in the late 1970s, given by Amory Lovins. Dr. Lovins was adamant that the demand for energy need not grow. Although most of the audience discounted his views, pointing to the historical record, he turned out to be more correct than his detractors. Now we have the opposite situation: with slow growth in energy demand and the potential for even slower growth, we are presented with a paper arguing that demand will grow substantially. Today that position goes against recent historical experience, at least in industrial economies. I think that Churchill is more correct than not. I would like to discuss a few of the reasons he postulates for his conclusion.
Churchill makes an interesting point about price controls on domestic energy industries. He argues that such controls induce inefficiencies because the controlled firn lowers the quality of the energy supplied, which leads some consumers to self-produce-at great expense. Thus when price controls are removed, overall costs are reduced, which increases demand.
An alternative explanation is that there is substantial demand for low-grade energy. Take the case of electricity. It is difficult to distribute multiple qualities of electricity (taking as an indicator of quality something like reliability or voltage). Assume that there are two types of consumers in a system-those who demand high quality and those who are content with low quality. Unless the system is a very efficient one that can selectively add and subtract consumers, the Charles D. Koistad is professor of economics in the Department of Economics and the IustitUte for Environmental Studics at the University of Illinois, Urbana.
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e 1994 The Intenational Bank for Reconstruction and Development / ThEwoRD BANK optimal structure for this market may well be a low-reliability grid in conjunction with supplemented generation from those who seek high quality. Thus getting rid of price controls may increase prices and reduce demand-the reverse of the paper's assumption. A second point concerns what Churchill indicates is a basic assumption in his energy forecasts: that the income elasticity of demand for energy declines with income. It is not clear to me that this is true. Table 1 shows the growth rates of GDP and of the demand for commercial energy in the 1980-90 period. Note that energy demand seems to grow faster than income up to very high income levels. Furthermore, the low figure for high-income countries might be explained by the slow turnover of the capital stock (for instance, automobiles and housing). This question would appear to be ripe for further investigation.
The paper makes the point that technical change will unequivocally lower prices and thus stimulate demand. Certainly, lowering the cost of supply will do just this, and Churchill makes a good case that such cost reduction may be substantial. Another, more intriguing, point is that improved end-use efficiency will increase the demand for energy. The argument is that increased efficiency raises the marginal utility attainable from a unit of energy, which will lead to higher consumption-the effective price of energy has been lowered. This argument breaks down when the efficiency gain is not free-for example, if increased efficiency is achieved by substituting capital (or labor) for energy. One may see a substitution into capital, which would bring about a decline in energy use.
Churchill's paper does not consider the point that technical change can use energy as well as save it. Much of our recent experience is with periods of rapidly rising energy prices. If prices remain stable, technical changes that lead to greater use of energy are entirely possible and should not be ruled out (see Berndt, Kolstad, and Lee 1993 for evidence on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD).
Churchill says that forecasts of improved energy efficiency are based to a certain extent on engineering studies and typically overestmate the potential savings in energy. I am reminded of one (admittedly extreme) prescription for reducing gasoline consumption in the United States: require people to plan their purchases so that they only make one shopping trip a month. Although this solution is technologically feasible and appears to achieve significant savings in gasoline, it obviously neglects other factors involved in decisions on energy consumption. Having said this, I agree with Schipper that the past is not a totally adequate indicator of the future; engineering analysis does have a role in the exmination of energy futures.
Tuming to control of greenhouse gases, Churchill states that this is a property rights issue which is unlikely to have any effect on the use of energy in the coming decades. I would disagree. This may be a question of semantics, but I do not view the greenhouse gas issue as a case of poorly defined property rights. The global climate is the purest of public goods; emission of greenhouse gases is an externality that needs to be internalized, and the imposition of a tax to do that is not unlikely. The Clinton administration considered such a tax and rejected it. The European Community has proposed an energy tax based on the carbon content (50 percent) and the energy content (50 percent) of fuels. The likelihood of a substantial carbon tax by 2020 is certainly not zero. A substantial carbon tax could reduce energy demand significantly, or capital could be substituted for emissions, with less decline in energy use. Churchill's paper is a fascinating investigation of the future of energy prices and consumption. These issues have an important bearing on energy policy, and the empirical hypotheses advanced in the paper should be tested. J would like to comment on three interconnected aspects of Churchilrs presentation, not with the intent-or, for that matter, the need-to voice serious disagreement, but rather to provide a slightly different slant. I will take up, first, the matter of energy growth in developing countries and its significance for global CO 2 emissions; second, the dosely related question of the roIe of technology; and third, distortion in energy markets.
Perhaps even more starkly than others who have addressed the issue, Churchill, in this paper, documents the prospects for and implications of significantly higher levels of energy consumption by developing economies over the next several decades. One of those implications is that there is a dilemma of holding down CO 2 emissions even while supporting the economic goals of these nations and facilitating their access to the affordable energy supplies needed to realize their goals. Table 1 is based on a very simple, but nonetheless revealing, dissection of global CO 2 trends (see Ogawa 1991). The analysis recognizes that reduced levels of growth rates of CO 2 emissions from the energy sector can be approximated as the sum of changes in four factors: (a) population, (b) the ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) to population, (c) the ratio of energy to GDP, and (d) the ratio of CO 2 to energy.
Other things being equal, slower population growth means less growth in CO 2 , while higher GDP per capita means a larger volume of CO 2 emissions.
There are no breathtaking insights here. The ratio of energy to GDP is a measure of an economy's aggregate energy intensity. All else being unchanged, a drop in this rato means less CO 2 emitted. The forces that can contribute to this decline-such as efficiency improvements in generating electricity-are key elements in models of CO, 2 abatement strategies. Finally, the ratio of energy to CO 2 spotlights the overall effect of a changing mix of energy sources and forms with varying amounts of carbon content in Joel Darmstadtcr is senior fdaow at Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Tablc 1. Contributions to Global and Regional Growth in C0 2 Emissions, 1973-87 relation to their heat value. Clearly, an important issue in the determination of CO 2 mitigation costs is the ease or difficulty of altering that mix away from carbon-intensive fuels (such as coal) and toward sources that are lean in-or devoid of-carbon (natural gas, solar power, and nuclear power).
Interestingly, table 1 shows that 4 'desirable" trends in both the energy intensity and the carbon content of fuels were insufficient to overcome the dominant impact on the increase in global CO 2 of the growth of population and of income per capita. The figures for developing countries are particularly striking. The combination of their ratios of energy to GDP and of CO 2 to energy would have produced a growth in CO 2 emissions of just 1 percent a year. But population growth coupled with rising income per capita led to a growth rate of more than 5 percent.
Among industrial countries as a whole, declining energy intensity and the changing energy mix almost offset growth of population and income per capita, leaving CO 2 emissions virtually unchanged. Within the industrial country group, the contrast between the records of the United States and Japan is worth noting. Japan's much sharper decline in energy intensity and more conspicuous shift away from carbon-containing fuels brought about an average annual rate of decline of CO 2 emissions of approximately 0.5 percent, as against the U.S. increase of close to 0.4 percent.
If we apply this same organizing scheme to the future, we can ask what would need to happen to stabilize CO 2 emissions across the board. (For details see Darmstadter and Fri 1992) . First, assume that growth in population and income per capita are as shown in table 2. These projections, taken from the "baseline scenario" developed by the Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change (wcc), suggest only a minimal satisfaction of developing country economic aspirations (although the numbers are a bit higher than the World Energy Council figures discussed by Churchill). Assume further that the rate of improvement in energy intensity achieved by the industrial councries during 1973-87 is achieved worldwide for the period 1985-2025 (a rate double that postulated by the iPcc). Finally, assume that CO 2 emissions grow at 0.2 percent a year during this time.
Near-stabilization performance is by no means the most draconian trajectory envisaged by the ipcc-indeed, it represents the group's least problematic path. The scenario allows for continued CO 2 emission growti through 2050. Thereafter emissions abate, falling to somewhat below current levels by the end of the next century.
For industrial countries table 2 shows that the hypothesized rates of change in energy intensity and carbon intensity are close to the 1973-87 experience. This may be a realistic prospect, although the historical record on which it is predicated spanned the energy crisis, during which real energy prices were considerably higher than today.
The challenge for developing economies seems much more daunting. Reducing energy use per unit of GDP tO the 1.9 percent annual rate assumed in table 2 contrasts with a rate of increase of 1.2 percent recorded by these countries during 1973-87. Even more striking is the improvemetit that would be required in carbon intensity: an annual decrease of 2.3 percent would be needed to balance accounts-something well outside the experience of either industrial or developing countries. Meeting a fuel-switching goal of such dimensions is certain to require major technological innovation. Alternatively, counting on improvements in energy efficiency to avoid significant fuel switching would push the efficiency improvement target beyond historical precedent. If fuel switching progressed only at the historical rate of, say, 0.4 percent, developing country energy intensity would have to drop 3.8 percent each year, surpassing even Japan's performance in recent decades. All this is one more reason to dismiss as unrealistic the imposition of such CO 2 constraints on developing countries.
The point need not be belabored: dealing with dimate change presupposes or-depending on one's judgment-raises serious questions as to whether technology can be developed to permit major gains in energy efficiency and fuel-mix shifts and, if so, whether progress is likely to meet the implications of the exercise in table 2. Here the Churchill paper-although not cast in precisely the same numerical framework-offers both subtle and useful insights. By subtle, I refer to the reminder that technological change leading to reductions in the cost of energy services can stimulate new or rising demand for those services. That is, do not foreclose a situation in which energy consumption reaches higher-thanexpected levels, notwithstanding a concomitant reduction in energy intensity, if the technology in question has the potential for delivering economic value.
The paper also provides suggestive-even if far from foolproof-evidence that technologically promising approaches for substantially mitigating energyassociated environmental damages are available which meet or may be nearing reasonable criteria of cost-effectiveness. Experience and research demonstrate as much for regional pollution-management efforts; CO 2 constraints will prove less tractable, although the argument on that score persists. Dennis Anderson's marginal cost representation-suggesting virtually 100 percent CO 2 abatement potential at, say, 3-4 cents per kilowatt-hour and, presumably, much lower marginal costs at lesser but still respectable degrees of CO 2 mitigation-injects an intriguing note into the debate. (To be sure, we are talking about the electric power sector only, but it accounts for a big share of worldwide CO 2 release.)
And last, how are these developments likely to be affected by a policy context that seems increasingly (and globally) to spurn subsidies, price controls, and other market interventions as inimical to sound energy and environmental goals? Churchill points to the analytical task of disentangling energy trends under freer market conditions. Take, for example, public sector underpricing and restricted supplies of electricity that force consumers to resort to costlyhence, demand-limiting-alternatives. (Ancients among us will remember how in the United States, when natural gas prices were controlled, pipeline companies were busily contracting for costly imported liquefied natural gas to meet their market expectations.) It is entirely possible that rational pricing would trigger reductions in overall electricity prices, thus reinforcing the growth of energy demand in the developing countries. The fact is that energy markets around the world remain highly distorted. A recent study (OECD 1992) estimates energy subsidies (net of taxes) at about $235 billion in 1985, equivalent to $45 per ton of carbon worldwide, and $175 per ton in the former U.S.S.R. (Interestingly, Western Europe, in spite of heavy coal subsidies in the United Kingdom and Germany, is a net-taxing region, largely owing to high motor-fuel taxes, whose origins have little to do with social costs generally or environmental externalities in particular.)
The consequences of a more competitive electricity market in the United States also illustrate the ambiguity of outcomes. An aggressive demand-side management regime might reduce consumption through cost-effective conservation. But freer entry of independent power producers and the opening up of transmission services could enhance rather than inhibit the economic attractiveness of electricity, forcing one to either document or search for the additional externalities whose intemalization would offset the consequences of lower costs.
Objective analysis compels one to be open-minded about the directional implications of reducing market imperfections.
To conclude: both in laying out plausible energy scenarios for the next thirty years and (perhaps even more) in flagging some hidden booby-traps that may shroud these scenarios with more uncertainty than meets the eye, the Churchill paper performs a useful and welcome function.
FLOOR DISCUSSION OF THE SCHIPPER AND CHURCHILL PAPERS E veryone seemed to be saying that we need to get the prices right and we need definable properry rights, said Karen Polenske, a speaker in the roundtable on infrastructure. Defining property rights is not that simple, she and her colleagues have been learning, and she wondered exactly what the speakers meant by the term. As a member of a group working to set up a program for marketable permits in an air quality management district in Los Angeles, she wondered how others had dealt with the issues of equity and efficiency that were involved.
Churchill responded that when he referred to property rights in connection with carbon dioxide and global warming, he meant that nations had to sit down and bargain about who had the right to put what into the commons. If the commons is limited, we have to share it. We have to decide whether the property rights go to the irresponsible producers or to the irresponsible consuners.' These issues require difficult value judgments, and Churchill doubted they would ever be settled.
James Sweeney (discussant) agreed with Polenske that defining property rights is not easy but said it was no surprise. Those property rights that are easy to define-such as the rights to one's own labor-have already been defined; property rights to the air and to biodiversity are much more difficult. The program to limit pollution in southern California defines property rights in a way that allows people to exchange property rights for environmental depletion. The use of tradable emnission permits for sulfur dioxide and precursors of acid rain is a good example. Simnilarlv. said Sweeney, agreements that define real property rights to biodiversity enable developing countries to negotiate long-term contracts with drug companies and provide incentives to protect biodiversity. All of this is awkward and difficult, and there is no real answer, but it is an exciting move forward in trying to harness the market to help solve environmental problerns.
The session wa. chaired by Andrew Steer, deputy director of the World Bank's Environnent Department.
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©g 1994 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development r THE vORW mn Polenske, who had been working in China on an energy-efficiency project, said that China was making strides toward reducing its energy intensity and asked what explained China's decision, at this early stage of development, to reduce energy intensities. Churchill responded that China was experiencing dramatic improvements because it had been so far behind. Some Chinese power plants he had visited in 1985 were getting 14 percent heat efficiencies-a figure not seen in the United States since about 1910 or maybe earlier.
Referring to Schipper's statement that Poland's energy intensity was increasing as the country moved toward a market system, a participant from the World Bank noted that in Eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R. the general pattern was for energy intensity to increase significantly as countries privatized. In Russia and Ukraine energy intensity had increased 9 or 10 percent a year for the past two years. This contrasted with the pattem in market economies, where energy intensity declines considerably during an economic downtown-faster than GDP itself. He was therefore puzzled by the popularity these days of lowdemand forecasts, especially for the former U.S.S.R. He did not find Schipper's rapid reform scenario particularly plausible and said that it was hard to believe that in twenty-five years energy consumption in the former U.S.S.R. would be lower than it is today.
T-he questioner admitted that the waste of energy in the former U.S.S.R. is enormous, but he noted that other factors are involved. First, the widely held belief that, because the economy of the formner U.S.S.R. was created for noneconomic reasons, the capital stock is out of step with the market is not necessarily true. Russia appears to have a strong underlying comparative advantage in energy-intensive indusries, so if there is going to be a shakeout, it is not going to be at the expense of energy-intensive activities. Second, there is a huge pent-up demand for energy-intensive goods and services, induding paper, chemicals, and private transport, that will put upward pressure on energy demand. Third, Russia has a dual economy in which an advanced sector is combined with very underdeve'loped sectors, and in the really underdeveloped areas income elasticity is fairly high. Fourth, the factcr market in the former socialist economies is likely to change in the direccion of more energy intensity. not less. These were full employment-or overemployment-economies in which labor substituted for energy and was used inefficiently. So, he observed, there is going to be a considerable push toward substituting energy for labor as enterprise managers try to minimize costs.
Schipper conceded that these were valid points but contended that the increased energy intensity in Poland is very short term and noted that it was attributable to underutilization of capacity. The literature shows that the ratio of energy to GDP has historically falen fastest in periods of rapid economic growth.
Schipper also observed that multinational companies are making it easier to improve energy efficiency. Energy-using capital is making its way to the rest of the world, induding the formerly planned economies and China. New technolo-gies will find their way to the developing world in ten years, and those ten years will make an enormous difference in the use of resources.
As for the contention that energy will be substituted for labor in Russia, he agreed that the rates of decline in energy, capital, and labor depend on relative cost to some extent but argued that it would be a mistake to expect the wholesale substitution of energy for capital. We substitute machines and know-how for sweat both to produce goods and, increasingly, so that v e can enjoy them.
A participant from Pakistan asked if there were any estimates of the extent of pilferage of energy services in the developing economies and, if pilferage is a significant problem, what that did to comparisons of future demand in industrial and developing countries. Churchill said that unaccounted-for losses of electric power in developing countries were about 30 percent. (A well-run utility, he said, would consider-mostly technical-losses of about 4 or 5 percent acceptable.) A common assumption is that half of that amount is stolen and half is lost through inefficiencies, but there is really no basis for the assumption. In Bangladesh losses are close to 60 percent. Such losses are shocking when one considers, for example, that China is building a 1,000-megawatt coal-fired plant or its equivalent every month. If 30 percent of the electricity is unaccounted for, 30 percent more electricity has to be delivered, which represents a whacking capital investment and has an enormous effect on the environment.
Andrew Steer (chair) said that environmentalists often criticize the World Bank for paying little attention to energy efficiency. The Bank's response, typically, is that 60 percent of adjustment loans, and almost all energy loans, have energy-pricing covenants. But critics say that real electricity prices in the developing countries have dedined during the 1980s, although they have risen in industnial countries. In that context Steer asked Schipper whether the World Bank should be working more dosely with developing country governments on such nonprice issues as building codes and other institutional interventions.
Schipper replied that the Bank should recognize the need to push energy efficiency and should have the will to do so. Its most important contribution, would be in areas where markets are underdeveloped, but most energy use is elsewhere. The Banlks influence in this area may be indirect; it could support more energy-efficient housing in the formerly planned economies, for example. But environmentalists must realize that the amount of energy use in individual households cannot always be controlled and that there is a limit to the degree to which the Bank can spo.aMeed energy efficiency. First, poverty has to be ended so that people can afford to buy a refrigerator in the first place; choices between energy-efficient and non-energy-efficient appliances come later. Schipper had learned from a study in Indonesia that when people bought a refrigerator, the two things that concerned them were bargaining for a lower price and bargaining for delivery of the refrigerator. And the reason energy intensity falls in upper-income countries and does not fall in middle-income countries is not that the latter are becoming less energy-efficient; it is that they are becoming more urbanized.
Special-interest groups argue for improving end-use efficiency, said Churchill, but very few households in the developing world have the kinds of appliances for which this concern is relevant. Something like 80 percent of the electricity used in the developing world is used by commercial and industrial enterprises, so the problem is much more an institutional one. In the late 1970s many Bank programs encouraged energy audits and energy efficiency in industry. Most of these programs did not even disburse, much less have an impact, since most industries had effective rates of protection of 100 percent or more. Protected industries, especially monopolies, had absolutely no incentive to become more efficient in their use of energy or of any other factor of production. So, the Bank said energy-efficiency programs were a waste of time; first these economies must become more competitive.
The main user of primary energy in most of these developing countries is the electric power sector. Just walking through a typical power plant in a developing country, one can see opportunities for improving efficiency 20 to 35 percent for relatively minor sums. If only a limited amount of money is available for improving energy efficiency, the biggest bang for the buck can be had by spending it in these power plants. Chasing after small consumers is difficult and expensive, but the Bank has tried it in a few places. Where it has worked-in Mexico, for example, where the real price of energy increased dramatically-all of a sudden people were interested, and private firms began meeting the need for energy efficiency. The problem is that if there is no demand for energy efficiency, it is very hard to sell.
Another paiticipant said that if we did get governments to raise the price of energy, we could not refuse to lend them the funds to improve energy efficiency. Churchill agreed but said that when the price is right, private initiative will respond to market demand.
Churchill ended the session by expressing a bias. He always worried, he said, when told that there were all kinds of externalities which the Bank should address. His instinct, he admitted, when people talked about externalities, was to see whose hands were on his wallet.
